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Key points 
Banks in the euro area still hold large amounts of debt of their own governments, creating the so-
called ‘doom loop’ between banks and their governments. In the discussions on how to break this 
loop, most argue that the own-funds charge should also apply to eurozone government debt, while 
the application of the large-exposure requirement would be more effective for these exposures that 
combine a low probability of default with a large loss given default.  
The large-exposure rule limits exposure to any one debtor to 25% of the bank’s capital to ensure that 
the bank can survive the insolvency of its largest debtors. Simulations of the application of this rule 
to government debt for the 109 systemic and largest banks in the eurozone shows that this might 
lead to problems in the allocation of government debt held by these banks. We therefore propose 
instead that the maximum exposure to any one sovereign should be limited to 50% of own capital. 
In this case it would be possible to allocate most of the existing sovereign exposure among these 
banks without creating tensions in the sovereign debt market. On the other hand, banks will still be 
able to hold sufficient government debt to fulfil the other regulatory requirements and market 
demands.  
Recommendations 
 A large exposure requirement of 50% of own funds should gradually be introduced to restrict 
the exposures to government debt of individual eurozone countries.  
 The expansion of the ECB’s asset purchase programme between March 2015 and September 
2016 could be a natural moment to start the implementation of the large-exposure requirement.  
 During the transition, intense monitoring will be required to allow for prompt action in case 
unintended side-effects or collisions with other measures erupt. 
 The large exposure requirement should be reviewed regularly after implementation to ensure 
that the underlying assumptions still hold. 
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Abstract 
The recent crises have shown that the eurozone countries’ government debt is not immune to defaults. Applying a 
large-exposure requirement also to eurozone government debt would be a logical measure to help break the bank-
government doom loop, given the low probability and high loss in the event of government default. But what would 
be the impact of a large-exposure requirement on the banking sector as well as on government funding? This Policy 
Brief performs a simulation exercise of the potential impact on 109 systemic eurozone banks, showing that their 
eurozone government debt portfolio would have to decrease by 3.2% or €63 billion if a 50% of own-funds cap would 
be applied on large exposures. The eurozone central banks’ demand for sovereign bonds under the extended asset 
purchase programme further creates momentum to gradually start implementing the restriction. 
 
Introduction 
In the past couple of years important steps have 
been taken towards breaking the doom loop1 
between systemic banks and their governments 
(see Figure 1).2 The impact of a sovereign default 
on the domestic banking sector, the other part of 
the doom-loop, have however not been 
addressed.3 While the newly established 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
responsible for more orderly restructuring in 
case of government distress reinforces the 
probability of write-downs on government debt 
by institutionalising burden-sharing with the 
private debtholders.  
                                                   
1 Coined by the Bank of England in 2009, the expression 
‘doom loop’ refers to the vicious cycle in which weak banks 
in Europe are dragging down their governments, while 
weak governments are dragging down their countries’ 
banks. 
2 The global financial and consecutive eurozone economic 
crises have shown that there is still a strong relationship 
between banks and their domestic governments. On the one 
hand, governments had to support distressed systemic 
banks with capital and liquidity facilities; and on the other 
hand, banks suffered losses from fiscal pressures reducing 
the value of the government debt. The legislative overhaul 
in the aftermath of the crises is primarily intended to ensure 
that taxpayers’ money will never again be required to bail-
out banks. The new and amended legislation consists of a 
package that must reduce the likelihood that banks fail with 
more stringent capital and liquidity requirements as well as 
that they can be orderly resolved when they fail. Moreover, 
to avoid that the banking sector can break the Eurozone 
Figure 1. The doom loop between eurozone 
governments and banks and (possible) policy 
measures 
 
Source: Author. 
apart, a Banking Union with single supervisory and 
resolution mechanisms was installed for the eurozone 
countries.  
3 The new legislative framework is still unlikely to be able to 
absorb the failure of a couple of systemic banks at the same 
time. Hence, the funds that are currently being collected 
would have been insufficient to provide the necessary 
capital support during the past crises. The estimated €180 
billion that will be collected in the coming years in the single 
resolution fund (Lannoo, 2014), deposit guarantee funds 
and the funds available through the ESM do not weigh up 
to the over €450 billion that was made available in the form 
of public capital support and asset relief measures in the 
eurozone (Ayadi & De Groen, 2015). Although the bail-in 
facilities and more stringent capital requirements are likely 
to bring down the costs that are passed to the public 
mechanism in case of future systemic failures, the funds 
available for bailouts and recapitalisations remain limited.  
THE ECB’S QE: TIME TO BREAK THE DOOM LOOP BETWEEN BANKS AND THEIR GOVERNMENTS | 3 
 
In fact, the private-sector involvement (PSI) will 
adopt a case-by-case approach, following the 
IMF’s practices. The Greek debt restructuring in 
2012 is the most recent case showing the impact 
of a eurozone government’s default on the 
stability of the domestic banking sector 
according to the IMF’s practices. As part of the 
debt restructuring, the majority of private 
investors in Greek government debt agreed to 
take a total ‘voluntary’ loss of over 50% on their 
debt holdings.4 The domestic banks lost €38 
billion, which wiped out the complete own funds 
of most of the banks.5  
Despite the debt restructuring, there remain 
concerns over the sustainability of the Greek 
government’s debt, as well as concerns about the 
banking sector. The four largest Greek banks in 
the ECB’s 2014 comprehensive assessment still 
had domestic government debt equivalent to 
their total own funds at the end of 2013, which 
means that a renewed sovereign write-down 
could once again wipe-out almost all of their own 
funds. 
The Greek banks are no exception with respect to 
substantial government debt holdings. The 110 
eurozone banking groups subject to the 
comprehensive assessment6 held at the end of 
2013 almost €2.5 trillion government debt, 
representing almost twice the total sum of own 
funds. Albeit the holdings are unequally divided 
across banks and countries. Almost a quarter of 
the banks have government debt portfolios equal 
to or less than their own funds (see Figure 2). 
About half of the banks hold government debt 
ranging between once and three times their own 
funds. The remaining quarter of the banks with 
larger government debt portfolios includes a 
small group of five banks with government 
portfolios ranging between 10 and 34 times their 
total own funds. 
Figure 2. Distribution of government exposure across eurozone systemic banks (end 2013) 
 
Note: The histogram shows the total exposure to governments (gross domestic long exposure - accounting value gross of 
provisions) as a share of the total own funds across different own funds bins. The values below the bars show the maximum 
values of each bin, which is the minimum value for the next bin. Hence, 18% of the banks had exposures to governments 
between 150% and 200% of the own funds. The distribution is based on data on 109 eurozone banking groups and 
subsidiaries of non-EU banks that were subject to the EBA and ECB 2014 stress tests, excluding the Co-operative Central 
Bank Ltd in Cyprus, which reported a negative own funds.  
Source: Author’s calculations based on ECB and EBA 2014 stress test data. 
                                                   
4 The participation in these kinds of agreements will in the 
future be obligatory for all participants using the collective-
action clauses that are included in the by-laws of all 
eurozone government bonds issued since 1 January 2013 
(Xafa, 2014).  
5 The €38 billion was equivalent to about 170% of their core 
equity tier 1 capital before the PSI. The core tier 1 capital 
forms the most important part of the total own funds. The 
capital of the Greek banks subject to the 2014 stress tests 
consisted of 97% out of core tier 1 capital at the end of 2013 
(Bank of Greece, 2012).   
6 The Co-operative Central Bank Ltd in Cyprus, which 
reported a negative own funds at the end of 2013, has been 
excluded in the simulation exercise of this Policy Brief. 
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Turning to the composition of the government-
debt portfolios, they mostly consist of domestic 
government debt. The eurozone banks’ 
government exposures consist, on average, of 
58% domestic debt, ranging from a low of 12.5% 
in Latvia to a high of 92.3% in Malta (see Figure 
3). The banks in CGIIPS,7 which experienced the 
most severe fiscal sustainability problems during 
the eurozone government debt crisis, hold the 
largest shares of domestic debt. This 
overrepresentation can be partially explained by 
the carry-trade opportunities available to these 
banks during the eurozone crisis. Hence, the 
returns on government debt during the recent 
periods of distress in some countries exceeded 
the banks’ funding costs, thereby providing an 
incentive for banks to hold more government 
debt (Acharya & Steffen, 2012). These carry 
trades undermine financial stability (Gros, 2013).  
Figure 3. Home bias in government-debt exposure of systemic banks in the eurozone (end 2013) 
 
Note: The figure shows the share of country exposure as a share of the total government exposures (gross domestic long 
exposure - accounting value gross of provisions) of the 110 eurozone banking groups and subsidiaries of non-EU banks 
that were subject to the EBA and ECB 2014 stress tests. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on ECB and EBA 2014 stress test data. 
Simulation 
The possibility of a eurozone government 
defaulting is low, but the share that is lost in the 
event of default is often very large. The 
application of large-exposure requirements 
could be a measure to limit the loss-given default. 
It would encourage banks to diversify their 
government-debt portfolios. The large-exposures 
requirements, as currently included in the capital 
requirements legislation, put a €150 million or 
25% of own funds cap on exposures to a single 
debtor. Government debt denominated in 
national currency, however, is 
                                                   
7 CGIIPS stands for Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, 
and Spain. 
 
excluded from the scope of these requirements. 
The euro is considered as the national currency 
for the Eurozone countries, notwithstanding the 
fact that these countries do not control their own 
currency like non-eurozone countries do and are 
unable to de facto guarantee repayment like non-
eurozone countries can with their national 
central banks. The eurozone government debt 
holdings should therefore also be treated 
differently, with a large exposures requirement 
to limit the loss given default.  
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To assess the potential impact of the application 
of large-exposures requirements, a simulation 
exercise was performed for this paper. At the end 
of 2013, about 63% of eurozone banks’ 
government exposures were above the large-
exposure thresholds (see Figure 4 and Table A1 
in the Annex). These excess government holdings 
are primarily held in government debt of the four 
largest government debt issuers, i.e. France, 
Germany, Italy, and Spain, which account for 
almost 80% of the € 1.3 trillion excess holdings. 
Figure 4. Simulation of the impact of the application of max 25% large-exposure requirement to government debt  
(% of eurozone government debt) 
 
Notes: The figure shows the results of a simulation of the potential impact of the application of the large-exposure 
requirement to eurozone government debt, split between government loans and securities. In other words, individual 
banks cannot invest more than 25% of their own funds in the government debt of a eurozone country (i.e. large exposures 
impact). Moreover, the banks are assumed to try to keep the size of their total government-debt portfolio constant by re-
investing the excesses in government-debt securities of other eurozone countries pro rata the share in total eurozone 
government debt (i.e. re-investment). The total exposure of all banks in the sample, however, never exceeds more than 60% 
of the total outstanding debt (i.e. government debt impact). The simulation is based on end 2013 data for the 109 systemic 
eurozone banking groups included in the ECB’s Comprehensive Assessment.  
Source: Author’s calculations based on ECB, EBA and AMECO (2014). 
The net impact on the banks’ eurozone 
government debt portfolios is nevertheless likely 
to be much less, since most of the banks will re-
invest most of the excess government debt 
holdings in other eurozone countries’ 
government debt. Hence, most banks do not have 
the maximum exposures to each individual 
eurozone country, and the legislation as well as 
market practices still motivate banks to hold 
sizeable government debt portfolios. Just to 
                                                   
8 The Basel capital adequacy accords consider that domestic 
government debt denominated in national currency is 
riskless, since the country controls the currency. However, 
this is not the case for the eurozone, which is not controlled 
name a few of the government-debt preferences 
expressed in legislation and capital market 
practices, domestic currency government-debt 
benefits from a zero risk-weight under the 
standard approach;8 government bonds are an 
important part of the high-quality liquid assets 
(HQLA) required to fulfil the liquidity 
requirements that are applicable from 2015 
onwards; and a source of collateral to obtain 
central bank funds. In addition, government debt 
by an individual member state. The zero risk weight for 
eurozone government debt is therefore not in the spirit of 
the Basel accords (Hannoun, 2011). 
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is also important to fulfil the margin calls in 
derivatives transactions and in securities 
repurchasing transactions that require highly 
liquid and low risky assets. 
Assuming that the banks will try to reinvest all 
proceeds from selling the excess government 
debt in government debt of other eurozone 
countries, they could reallocate all but €102 
billion of the €1.3 trillion excess without 
breaching the large-exposure requirements (see 
‘Reinvestments’ in Figure 4). However, this 
would imply that the banks would hold the large 
majority or more than the available government 
debt of some of the governments, which is 
respectively highly unlikely or even impossible. 
The maximum share held by the sample banks in 
the simulation is assumed to be no more than 
60% (see ‘Government debt impact’ in Figure 4). 
The government debt holdings after 
reinvestments in eight eurozone countries pass 
this threshold. After correcting for reinvestments 
of the excesses in the government debt of the 
remaining 11 eurozone countries, the net amount 
that could not be reinvested without breaching 
the large-exposure requirements would rise from 
€102 billion to €203 billion, which is equal to 10% 
of the government-debt holdings (see 
‘Simulated’ in Figure 4).9 The excess is divided 
across almost a quarter of the banks in the sample 
and more than half of all the exposures to the 
larger debt-issuing countries are equal to the 
large exposure requirement.  
The 25% of own funds or €150 million threshold 
is restrictive for a large number of banks. It 
restricts the ability of a large number of banks to 
maintain a well-diversified and sizable eurozone 
government-debt portfolio. This will become 
even more important in the near future, with the 
implementation of liquidity requirements and 
changes in the market infrastructure. The 
European Banking Authority calculated in its 
most recent Basel III monitor exercise that banks 
would on average still need extra HQLA equal to 
0.6% of assets (approximately €136 billion) to 
comply with the fully implemented liquidity 
coverage ratio. In fact, using data from the EBA 
monitor, the total HQLA required by the banks 
included in the simulation would be between 
€1,485 billion and €2,388 billion, of which the 
majority is currently covered by bonds issued by 
sovereigns, central banks and public entities. 
Moreover, banks might also demand more 
government securities to comply with collateral 
requirements for transactions with central 
counterparties (CCPs), which are becoming 
obligatory for more and more derivatives 
transactions as well as for more stringent margin 
calls on OTC derivatives transactions. On the 
other hand, the extension of the current large-
exposure requirement to the eurozone countries’ 
debt is likely to disproportionally support the 
demand for government debt of smaller 
countries, reducing the need to observe to fiscal 
discipline.  
The large-exposure requirement should find the 
right balance between reducing the loss-given 
sovereign default and allowing banks to build 
substantial and diverse pools of liquid assets to 
fulfil the requirements. In Table A3 in the Annex 
the simulated net impact for different levels of 
large-exposure requirements is shown. The 
simulation results suggest that a large-exposure 
requirement of 100% of own funds or higher is 
needed to substantially reduce the pressures on 
the smaller eurozone debt issuers. Although this 
would prevent the own funds of banks from 
being completely wiped out, as was the case for 
many Greek banks under the PSI, sovereign 
defaults could still cause systemic problems now 
that there are more banks with substantial 
holdings of a typical eurozone government debt 
that need to be recapitalised at the same time. 
  
                                                   
9 The impact of the application of the large-exposure 
requirements is very diverse across countries. The demand 
for government debt issued by the four largest issuing 
countries is likely to decline considerably, between -€81 
billion in French and -€248 billion in German government 
debt. In turn the demand for the debt of smaller debt-issuing 
countries will rise considerably, between €1 billion in 
Estonian and €75 billion in Greek government debt. 
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Figure 5. Simulation of the impact of the application of max 50% large-exposure requirement to government debt 
(% of eurozone government debt)  
 
Notes: The figure shows the results of a simulation of the potential impact of the application of a 50% of own funds large-
exposure requirement to eurozone government debt. See the notes to Figure 4 for an explanation. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on ECB, EBA and AMECO (2014). 
The application of a large-exposure requirement 
between 25% and 100% might be more 
appropriate. With a large-exposure requirement 
of 50%, on the one hand, the need for public 
recapitalisations in case of default is reduced, 
since the losses of the sovereign default are 
unlikely to let the total capital of a minimum of 
8% fall below the core tier 1 level of 4.5%. On the 
other hand, the stimulation of disproportionate 
investment in the more illiquid debt of smaller 
debt-issuing countries is also restricted. In fact, 
banks could hold up to at least 5.5 times their 
own funds (i.e. 11 eurozone countries with 
relatively deep sovereign debt markets times the 
50% large-exposure threshold) in eurozone 
sovereign debt. For 93% of the banks in the 
sample, this would be sufficient to leave the size 
of their eurozone sovereign-debt portfolio 
unchanged and prevent disproportionate 
demand for government debt from the smaller 
issuers. The remaining banks with ‘excessive’ 
eurozone government debt portfolios are 
primarily specialised financers of local 
governments, central banks of cooperative 
networks and clearing institutions. These banks 
might need to increase their own funds, change 
their business model or divert the sovereign 
securities holdings to non-eurozone sovereigns 
(Ayadi & De Groen, 2014).  
Let us now look at the impact on the demand for 
sovereign debt. The share of three of the four 
largest eurozone debt issuers is likely to decrease 
in banks’ portfolios (i.e. Germany, Italy, and 
Spain). In the simulation exercise, the aggregate 
share of the four largest debt issuers (also 
including France) is likely to decrease from 78% 
to 64%. The smaller government debt issuers 
benefit from the fact that the maximum large 
exposures represent a relatively larger share of 
their total debt issued and eurozone countries in 
which the banks own the lowest share of debt 
before the implementation of the large-exposure 
requirement are likely to benefit more since there 
is more room for re-investments (see also Table 
A2 in the Annex for the impact across countries).   
Momentum 
The recently announced quantitative easing (QE) 
through an expansion of the asset purchase 
programme by the national central banks in the 
eurozone might serve as a natural moment to 
start reducing the maximum exposure of banks 
to single eurozone countries’ government debt.  
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First, the €1,140 billion extension of the asset 
purchase programme will, among other things, 
generate a large stable demand during at least the 
19 months’ duration of the programme. This will 
allow the banks to offload the excess exposures 
in a rather short period of time against attractive 
rates. The asset purchase programme will 
especially generate demand for government-debt 
securities of the largest debt-issuing countries, of 
which banks have to offload the most. Hence, 
about three-quarters of the government debt that 
has to be sold or not rolled-over to fulfil the 50% 
of the own funds large-exposure requirement 
could be purchased by the central banks under 
the extended asset purchase programme. Of the 
almost €700 billion government debt securities 
that are in excess of the large exposure cap, 
almost 90% originated in one of the four largest 
eurozone government debt-issuing countries. 
These four will account for about 75% of the asset 
purchase programme that will be distributed 
according to the ECB capital key.  
Second, the quantitative easing might worsen the 
debt sustainability and thus increase the 
probability of default. Hence, the growth of the 
government debt might exceed economic growth 
and the lower debt-maintenance cost would be 
only temporary. The aim of the expansion of the 
asset purchase programme is to stimulate 
inflation with low interest rates. This move aims 
to stimulate economic growth through more 
consumption/investment and depreciation of 
the euro, but the past has shown that this 
scenario is far from certain. For example Japan 
showed that quantitative easing might even have 
the opposite effect; people might start saving 
(pensions, etc.) more, instead of 
consuming/investments (Gros, 2014). On the 
other hand, the lower yields on government debt 
will not only temporarily reduce the funding 
costs of countries, but also reduce the pressure on 
government to exercise fiscal discipline. Once the 
central banks start unwinding after the asset 
purchase programme is completed in September 
2016, the demand for government debt will fall 
                                                   
10 A separation should be made between the transition of 
debt securities and loans. The transition period for the 
again, increasing the funding costs and the 
probability of default. 
The immediate gradual introduction of the large-
exposure requirement10 could both limit the loss-
given default for banks as well as correct the 
flawed fiscal discipline.  
Conclusion 
The recent crises have shown that eurozone 
government debt is not immune to default and 
that the new legislative framework can ease debt 
restructuring with private-sector burden-sharing 
in the future. Applying the large-exposure 
requirement would be a welcome addition, 
limiting the potential losses in the event of a 
sovereign default. Given the paramount 
importance of government debt for banks and 
the limited availability of government debt of 
smaller issuing countries, the applied large 
exposure required could be gradually reduced to 
only 50%, instead of the 25% that applies to most 
other debtors. The higher cap would still 
substantially reduce the potential losses for 
individual banks, while still allowing banks to 
build up the sizable government debt portfolios 
that are needed to fulfil the other requirements 
(liquidity ratios, collateral demands, etc.). 
The extended asset purchase programme 
initiated by the ECB might serve as an opportune 
moment to introduce the large-exposure 
requirement. The asset purchases provide a vast 
demand for government debt securities for a 
longer period, especially for the larger debt-
issuing countries, which account for most of the 
debt that will need to be offloaded. Moreover, the 
asset purchases might increase the probability of 
government default in the long run.  
The transition process will require intense 
monitoring to allow prompt action in the event 
that unintended side-effects or collisions with 
other measures, like the new liquidity 
requirements and monetary policy, erupt.  
The proposed application of the large-exposure 
requirement on government debt is an effective 
legacy loans should be longer in order to take account of the 
absence of a well-functioning secondary market.  
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solution as long as sovereign defaults remain rare 
and largely uncorrelated events and the liquidity 
requirements remain untouched. As soon as 
these conditions appear likely to change, 
alternative measures might be needed. In the 
meantime the large-exposure requirement 
should be reviewed regularly.  
Finally, more research is required to identify 
other potential financial sectors (e.g. insurance, 
pensions, CCPs, etc.) that should be subject to 
similar measures to break the doom loop 
between eurozone governments and financial 
institutions.  
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Annex 
Table A1. Simulation impact of applying large exposure requirement to eurozone government debt (max. 25% of own funds and 60% of government debt) 
Debtor 
2013 reported 
Impact of large 
exposures 
threshold 
(25% of own funds) 
Impact of re-
investments of 
large exposure 
excesses 
Impact of 
government debt 
threshold 
(60% of 
government debt) 
Impact of re-
investment of 
government debt 
excesses 
Simulated 
exposures 
Net impact 
(€bn) 
(% gov. 
debt) 
(€bn) 
(% gov. 
debt) 
(€bn) 
(% gov. 
debt) 
(€bn) 
(% gov. 
debt) 
(€bn) 
(% gov. 
debt) 
(€bn) 
(% gov. 
debt) 
(€bn) 
(% gov. 
debt) 
AT 67 25 -20.8 -8 69.8 27 0.0 0 1.7 0 117 44 51 19 
BE 119 29 -56.2 -14 90.5 22 0.0 0 1.9 0 156 37 36 8 
CY 3 19 -2.4 -13 25.5 138 -15.5 -83 0.0 0 11 60 8 41 
DE 495 23 -351.2 -16 103.2 5 0.0 0 0.5 0 247 11 -248 -11 
EE 0 1 0.0 0 8.7 461 -7.6 -402 0.0 0 1 60 1 59 
ES 303 31 -218.2 -23 111.6 12 0.0 0 0.9 0 197 20 -106 -11 
FI 9 8 -0.2 0 50.0 44 0.0 0 1.6 0 61 52 51 44 
FR 341 18 -210.8 -11 129.6 7 0.0 0 0.3 0 260 13 -81 -4 
GR 21 7 -15.7 -5 88.6 28 0.0 0 2.1 0 96 30 75 23 
IE 21 10 -12.4 -6 71.1 33 0.0 0 2.1 0 82 37 61 27 
IT 414 20 -268.7 -13 104.5 5 0.0 0 0.4 0 251 12 -164 -8 
LT 1 5 0.0 0 21.6 158 -14.1 -103 0.0 0 8 60 8 55 
LU 5 48 -1.9 -18 18.3 171 -15.1 -141 0.0 0 6 60 1 12 
LV 1 10 0.0 0 17.3 195 -12.9 -145 0.0 0 5 60 4 50 
MT 1 20 -0.7 -14 13.6 260 -10.8 -206 0.0 0 3 60 2 40 
NL 132 30 -75.6 -17 100.0 23 0.0 0 2.0 0 159 36 26 6 
PT 35 16 -19.2 -9 68.9 31 0.0 0 1.9 0 86 38 52 23 
SI 5 21 -2.3 -9 29.2 115 -17.0 -67 0.0 0 15 60 10 39 
SK 16 39 -2.3 -6 35.1 87 -24.3 -61 0.0 0 24 60 8 21 
EURO 1,990 22 -1,259 -14 1,157 13 -117.2 -1 15.3 0 1,787 19 -203 -2 
Source: Author’s calculations based on ECB, EBA and AMECO (2014).  
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Table A2. Simulation impact of applying large exposure requirement to eurozone government debt (max. 50% of own funds and 60% of government debt) 
Debtor 
2013 reported 
Impact of large 
exposures 
threshold 
(25% of own funds) 
Impact of re-
investments of 
large exposure 
excesses 
Impact of 
government debt 
threshold 
(60% of 
government debt) 
Impact of re-
investment of 
government debt 
excesses 
Simulated 
exposures 
Net impact 
(€bn) 
(% gov. 
debt) 
(€bn) 
(% gov. 
debt) 
(€bn) 
(% gov. 
debt) 
(€bn) 
(% gov. 
debt) 
(€bn) 
(% gov. 
debt) 
(€bn) 
(% gov. 
debt) 
(€bn) 
(% gov. 
debt) 
AT 67 25 -12.5 -5 45.6 17 0.0 0 0.4 0 100 44 33 38 
BE 119 29 -43.3 -10 65.3 16 0.0 0 0.4 0 142 37 22 34 
CY 3 19 -1.9 -10 8.5 46 0.0 0 0.2 0 10 60 7 55 
DE 495 23 -268.0 -12 109.6 5 0.0 0 0.3 0 336 11 -158 16 
EE 0 1 0.0 0 4.5 238 -3.4 -179 0.0 0 1 60 1 60 
ES 303 31 -168.1 -17 98.4 10 0.0 0 0.3 0 233 20 -69 24 
FI 9 8 0.0 0 24.2 21 0.0 0 0.2 0 34 52 24 30 
FR 341 18 -149.1 -8 157.1 8 0.0 0 0.3 0 350 13 8 18 
GR 21 7 -11.4 -4 58.4 18 0.0 0 0.6 0 69 30 48 21 
IE 21 10 -7.9 -4 41.4 19 0.0 0 0.4 0 55 37 34 25 
IT 414 20 -218.9 -11 124.3 6 0.0 0 0.2 0 320 12 -94 15 
LT 1 5 0.0 0 7.5 55 0.0 0 0.3 0 8 60 8 60 
LU 5 48 -1.3 -12 6.8 64 -4.2 -39 0.0 0 6 60 1 60 
LV 1 10 0.0 0 6.5 73 -2.1 -24 0.0 0 5 60 4 60 
MT 1 20 -0.6 -12 5.5 106 -2.8 -54 0.0 0 3 60 2 60 
NL 132 30 -53.1 -12 74.6 17 0.0 0 0.5 0 154 36 22 35 
PT 35 16 -15.3 -7 41.6 19 0.0 0 0.4 0 61 38 27 28 
SI 5 21 -2.0 -8 9.8 39 0.0 0 0.1 0 13 60 8 52 
SK 16 39 0.0 0 12.3 31 -3.9 -10 0.0 0 24 60 8 60 
EURO 1,990 22 -953 -10 902 10 -16.3 0 4.7 0 1,927 19 -63 21 
Source: Author’s calculations based on ECB, EBA and AMECO (2014).  
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Table A3. Simulation impact of applying different levels of large exposures requirements (LE) to eurozone government debt (max. 0-200% of own funds 
and 60% of government debt) 
Debtor 
2013 reported 
Net impact 
(LE 25% of own 
funds) 
Net impact 
(LE 50% of own 
funds) 
Net impact 
(LE 75% of own 
funds) 
Net impact 
(LE 100% of own 
funds) 
Net impact 
(LE 200% of own 
funds) 
(€bn) 
(% gov. 
debt) 
(€bn) 
(% gov. 
debt) 
(€bn) 
(% gov. 
debt) 
(€bn) 
(% gov. 
debt) 
(€bn) 
(% gov. 
debt) 
(€bn) 
(% gov. 
debt) 
AT 67 25 51 19 33 13 25 9 21 8 10 4 
BE 119 29 36 8 22 5 9 2 6 2 2 0 
CY 3 19 8 41 7 36 6 30 4 20 3 18 
DE 495 23 -248 -11 -158 -7 -127 -6 -115 -5 -38 -2 
EE 0 1 1 59 1 59 1 59 1 59 0 18 
ES 303 31 -106 -11 -69 -7 -45 -5 -32 -3 -12 -1 
FI 9 8 51 44 24 21 18 16 14 13 7 6 
FR 341 18 -81 -4 8 0 38 2 34 2 6 0 
GR 21 7 75 23 48 15 30 9 24 8 13 4 
IE 21 10 61 27 34 16 25 12 23 11 10 5 
IT 414 20 -164 -8 -94 -5 -60 -3 -32 -2 -1 0 
LT 1 5 8 55 8 55 6 46 4 28 3 18 
LU 5 48 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 
LV 1 10 4 50 4 50 4 50 3 34 2 18 
MT 1 20 2 40 2 40 2 40 2 38 1 18 
NL 132 30 26 6 22 5 1 0 -8 -2 -25 -6 
PT 35 16 52 23 27 12 17 8 16 7 10 5 
SI 5 21 10 39 8 31 7 25 5 18 4 15 
SK 16 39 8 21 8 21 8 21 8 20 4 11 
EURO 1,990 22 -203 -2 -63 -1 -33 0 -20 0 0 0 
Source: Author’s calculations based on ECB, EBA and AMECO (2014). 
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